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Abstract 
Allocating the optimum amount of campaign resources to advertising is a critical question for 
political managers. This research presents the case of the 2016 Iowa Caucuses, in which over 
$46 million of broadcast television advertising was purchased on behalf of 21 Republican and 
Democratic candidates and run in eight media markets over 9 months. Using Federal 
Communication Commission (FCC)-derived data from more than 3,700 political advertising 
contracts, and responses to two waves of surveys among Iowa voters, this research considers the 
connection between advertising weight (adspend) and political outcomes in a media-saturated 
campaign. In contrast to some earlier studies, increasing levels of advertising spending did not 
serve to activate the interest of potential voters: while it was high to begin with, and went higher 
during the election period, the extra advertising was not associated with additional interest. 
However, increased advertising did result shifting of allegiances in the crowded Republican 
Caucus: in markets with heavy advertising, there was more churn in candidate preference. 
Additionally, overall adspend was correlated modestly with political outcomes: for the most part, 
high-spending candidates were the most successful in gaining support at the Caucuses. 
 
  




Optimizing the amount of advertising allocated to advertising campaigns has been a long-
running, managerial question for both brand marketers (Broadbent & Fry, 1995; Ephron & 
McDonald, 2002; Gerard J. Tellis, 2004; Vuokko & Wells, 1997) and political campaign 
managers (Burton, Miller, & Shea, 2015; Panagopoulos, 2006). For corporations, the issue is a 
matter of resources and returns. Overspending on advertising--in other words, spending past the 
point of effectiveness--means that fewer financial resources are available for all other corporate 
activities. Underspending on advertising may result in diminished market share. However, the 
consequences of overspending and underspending on brand campaigns are typically minor. 
While reputation and jobs may be at stake within the corporation and its advertising agencies, 
societal impacts are limited.  At worst, the impact shows in a few points of market share. 
The issue of advertising spending in political campaigns is more consequential. Because 
elections are winner-takes-all affairs, advertising spending is a component of victory or defeat, 
not market share. Additionally, not only are the winners and losers chosen in part by their 
advertising actions, but the participants are selected in part by their ability to raise funds for 
advertising. A continuing concern is that the roster of candidates for consideration by the 
electorate is limited to those with access to advertising funds. The Citizens United (2010) 
decision to allow unlimited advertising by organizations such as corporations and unions was, in 
part, a consideration of the power of advertising dollars in the political sphere (Levitt, 2010).  
The civic consequences of political advertising are broader than those of brand 
advertising. The choices available for political leadership, and the selection of political leaders 
are connected to the amount of political advertising. However, the research on the effects of 
political advertising is still in a developmental stage, with the question of political advertising 
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spending far from settled. This current project explores the outcomes of political advertising 
spending in a statewide election in which candidates and their supporters saturated a few media 
markets with advertising while spending substantially less on other media markets in the same 
election. The difference in advertising levels formed a natural experiment in which the effects of 
adspend could be seen in terms of political engagement, candidate preference, and final choice.  
This research explores the results of political advertising spending under conditions of 
advertising saturation, in which candidates and their supporters chose to advertise in selected 
markets with nearly complete reach and very high frequencies, versus the same candidates and 
supporters advertising in different markets using more moderate levels of reach and frequency. It 
provides an empirical exploration of political advertising spending at a time when a foreground 
issue is the extent to which saturation advertising funded through political donations, influences 
political choice.  
Literature Review 
Saturation has come to have multiple definitions in research. In the hard sciences, 
saturation is taken to mean the point at which any additional input replaces prior inputs, without 
creating addition output. The metaphor of saturation has been used in media research to indicate 
the point at which additional inputs, for example a new medium being added to an individual's 
media repertoire requires the displacement of other, prior media (Greer & Ferguson, 2014; 
Newell, Pilotta, & Thomas, 2008).  
In the advertising literature, saturation was taken to mean the point at which additional 
inputs, such as additional spending on advertising, no longer returned increased responses such 
as brand awareness. The AdStock model (Broadbent & Fry, 1995; Ephron & McDonald, 2002) 
proposed that the saturation point was where additional spending on advertising delivered no 
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increase in effects such as purchase intention. Further research on advertising repetition proposed 
that past the saturation point, not only do additional advertising not only fail to show positive 
impacts on sales,  saturation advertising generated negative attitudinal responses as individuals 
grew tired of the advertising (Schmidt & Eisend, 2015).  
 
Effect of political ad saturation on political engagement 
While prior research in political advertising has focused on the question of the 
capabilities of advertising to inform and direct the actions of the electorate (Patterson & 
McClure, 1976) and evaluation of candidates (Kaid, 2002; Kaid & Postelnicu, 2005) there has 
also been a stream of research that looks at the effects of advertising on political engagement. 
The literature is mixed on the question of advertising’s role in encouraging or discouraging 
political engagement. Experimental research has indicated that exposure to negative advertising 
diminishes intended voter turnout (S. Ansolabehere, Iyengar, Simon, & Valentino, 1994; S. D. 
Ansolabehere, Iyengar, & Simon, 1999). However, comparisons of survey research on voter 
turnout indicate no effect from negative advertising on actual turnout (Freedman & Goldstein, 
1999; Goldstein & Freedman, 2002; Wattenberg & Brians, 1999).  
In general, there appears to be an activation effect: political advertising leads to political 
activity (Goldstein & Freedman, 2002). However, this presumption has not been tested recently, 
even as the media landscape has changed to provide campaigns with the ability to reach large 
portions of the potential electorate on a nearly constant basis. Thus, this research first explores 
the effects of political advertising spending on voter engagement under modern conditions of 
media saturation.  
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H1: Increasing levels of political advertising will be associated with increasing amounts 
of political engagement.  
 
Effect of political ad saturation on candidate preference 
For advertising, both positive and negative, the literature tends to indicate a positive 
relationship between advertising spending and candidate preference (Soley, Craig, & Cherif, 
1988; Weaver-Lariscy & Tinkham, 1987). The relationship holds when looking at overall 
spending, or particular media such as radio (McCleneghan, 1987) and direct mail (Weaver-
Lariscy & Tinkham, 1987) and even yard signs(Green et al., 2016). However, while there may be 
an enduring relationship between adspend and candidate preference, there is less evidence that 
spending leads to candidate preference. Other factors may be at work: a candidate gaining in 
popularity attracts more donations, thus making the advertising a result of preference, not the 
cause. A corollary is brand advertising in which the dominant brand maintains its hold on the 
marketplace using advertising. Thus, a more rigorous test of the notion that advertising spending 
leads to candidate preference is the ability of advertising to change preference, not merely 
maintain preference. The second hypothesis of this research addresses the ability of advertising 
to mold candidate preferences in a media-saturated landscape.  
H2: increased amounts of political advertising will be associated with increased amounts 
of change in candidate preference.  
Effect of television advertising on election outcomes 
Elections are an exercise in obtaining or holding political power. While the engagement 
of potential voters and the intention to vote for a preferred candidate are key, it is the election 
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itself that opens the door to exercise political power. For the second half of the 20th century, 
television advertising has been considered to be the dominant form of electioneering in the US.  
The support for the linkage between television advertising spending and election outcome 
is robust. In the 1998, 1992, and 1996 presidential elections, increased advertising purchases 
were correlated to voting (Shaw, 1999). While the modern media landscape is changing to the 
point that digital advertising spending for goods and services is expected to outstrip television 
spending by as early as 2016 (Tadena, 2015), the spending for television advertising continues to 
dominate political budgets, especially for presidential campaigns. The final hypothesis for this 
research will retest the contention that television advertising spending correlates with political 
success.  
H3: The amount of television advertising spending will be correlated with election 
outcome.  
Television advertising and presidential primaries 
Demonstrations, riots, and police misconduct bedeviled the 1968 Democratic convention 
in Chicago, an event that saw the leadership-backed candidate, Hubert Humphrey, nominated 
without participating in a single primary. In the aftermath, both parties took steps to provide 
more opportunities to develop a wider array of candidates for president. One of the steps was to 
designate primary elections in states with relatively small populations and low media costs. 
Iowa, Nevada and New Hampshire fit the profile. Over the succeeding election cycles, multiple 
candidates took advantage of the low-cost national platform afforded by the early state primaries 
(Hull, 2008). Among Democrats, Jimmy Carter and Barack Obama’s campaigns gained 
credibility through early-state performances.  
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Iowa’s first-in-the-nation event gives the state’s voters an outsized impact in identifying 
viable candidates for president. The state is 30th largest in population, with 3. 1 million residents 
and approximately 1. 9 million registered voters. Party participation is nearly equally divided by 
Democrats, Republicans, and Independents. Rather than choosing candidates by ballot, the 
Democratic and Republican parties each hold caucuses, which are meetings of registered party 
members, typically held in public or semi-public spaces such as school auditoriums, town 
meeting halls, and churches meeting rooms. The caucuses are open only to party members, 
although on-site party registration is available.  
The caucuses are held on a single evening, and with few exceptions such as military 
service, absentee participation is not permitted. Each party follows its own procedures for their 
caucus. Democrats seat together the supporters of each candidate. There are multiple counts of 
the number of party members supporting a candidate, in which the supporters typically stand to 
be counted. Candidates are considered to be viable if they receive the support of at least 15% of 
the attendees. As the meeting progresses, change in support for a candidate is evidenced through 
changes in seating. The percentage of support is then translated into the number of delegates to 
the state party convention, and forwarded to the Democratic party headquarters.  
Republicans in Iowa follow a different process for determining candidate support. The 
meetings are held concurrently with the Democrat meetings, typically in public or semi-public 
spaces. In Republican caucuses, party members vote by writing their candidate’s name on paper 
scraps, which are then counted by the caucus chairman. Vote totals are reported to the 
Republican state party headquarters.  
The media landscape in Iowa allows for lower cost access to advertising than in more 
populated states. Two Nielsen designated market areas (DMAs), Des Moines-Ames (rank 72) 
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and Cedar Rapids (rank 90), consist nearly entirely of counties within Iowa, affording little waste 
for advertisers who wish to target Iowa caucus-goers and avoid paying for an out-of-state 
audience. Approximately 65% of the state population resides within those two DMAs. There are 
seven other media markets that fall partially within Iowa and partially within neighboring states. 
There is a greater degree of advertising waste within those seven markets, as the majority of each 
market’s audience resides outside Iowa and cannot participate in the caucuses. Typically 
campaigns purchase fewer television ads in those markets, relying on local events and more 
geographically constrained media such as local newspapers, outdoor advertising, and local radio.  
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The overall availability of low-cost television advertising, plus the divisions in the 
amount of advertising purchased in markets with low amounts of waste versus high amounts of 
waste, creates a natural experiment in the effects of saturation advertising in political campaigns. 
Party members of the same state, facing the same roster of candidates, made their choices at the 
same moment in time. The substantial difference for all was the amount of television advertising 
in their markets. This research takes advantage of that difference to explore the current effects of 
political advertising saturation.  
 Method 
 The hypotheses on the effects of advertising saturation on political interest, candidate 
choice, and voting outcome were addressed by comparing broadcast advertising purchases made 
before the 2016 Iowa Presidential Caucuses with responses from a two-wave panel survey of 
Iowa voters.  
Measurement of political advertising purchases 
 The Federal Communication Commission (FCC) collects information on political 
advertising purchases made on licensed broadcast television stations in the United States. 
Specifically, FCC rules 73.3526(e)(6) and 73.3527(e)(5) require that television and radio stations 
keep a file of “all requests for specific schedules of advertising time by candidates” and issue 
advertisers, as well as information about when the ads actually aired “as soon as possible, which 
the Commission has determined is immediately absent extraordinary circumstances” (see FCC, 
2017). The information is provided by the stations and consists of requests for airtime by 
candidate committees, National Association of Broadcasters affidavits self-certifying the 
organization as representing a political entity, and the advertising contracts as generated by the 
station or the station’s sales representation firms.  
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. The requests, affidavits, and contracts are uploaded to the online FCC Public Inspection 
File system within a few days of receipt by the television station in Adobe PDF format. While 
the PDF format allows for viewers to inspect the documents using any computer, the opportunity 
for automated data interpretation is limited. Additionally, the structure of each document is up to 
the purchaser, the station, or the sales representative firm, further limiting the opportunity for 
automated data interpretation.  
The unit of measurement for this research was the station’s advertising contracts. This 
was expected to provide valid documentation of broadcast advertising purchases. Contracts 
typically include the start and end dates, the number of ads, cost, and the daypart or show title for 
each purchase.  
 We were able to find only two studies that used the political files within the FCC’s Public 
Inspection File as a data source. In her doctoral thesis, Moshary (2015) took an econometrics 
approach to argue that a price differential existed for airtime purchased by supporters of different 
political parties that could not be distinguished by any quality other than the party preference of 
the purchaser. To conduct the analysis, she reviewed advertising contracts from stations in 19 
markets. The second study was an analysis by the Campaign Legal Center of 1,220 political 
advertiser identification forms filed with 240 stations in four markets, finding errors or omissions 
in 35% of the filings (McGehee & Moran, 2016). 
The coding for this research was conducted in cooperation with the Investigative Reports 
unit of one of the state’s newspapers, which used the data for a series of articles on political 
advertising spending. Each contract was inspected by a trained student coder, who recorded the 
contract number, the advertiser, start/stop dates, gross cost and number of spots. Coding for 
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advertising running between April 1, 2015, and Feb 1, 2016, began in October 2015, and ran 
through the first week of February 2016, following the February 1 Iowa Presidential Caucuses.  
Nielsen’s Designated Market Area denotes nine media markets that provide broadcast 
television service and measurement to the 99 counties of Iowa. Television call signs for each of 
the markets were determined using the Television Bureau of Advertising (TVB) markets and 
stations list. Adverting contracts from for operating full-power broadcasting stations were 
entered. Excluded were public television stations, low power stations, station translators, and 
stations not selling advertising.  
A semi-automated Google Sheets spreadsheet applied the station name and media market 
to each case from the FCC Station Index database. Candidate committees, super PACs, and other 
non-candidate organizations were identified by referencing the database on OpenSecrets.Org, a 
political advocacy group.  
Contracts were entered for both candidate committees and non-candidate organizations. 
As many contracts were updated as the campaigns progressed, only the latest version of any 
contract was entered for analysis, providing the most recent contract that reflected actual runs.  
 
Assessing interest in political participation and preference  
Political attitudes were measured in a telephone panel survey managed by the political 
science department of a large Midwestern university and a local television station, among 
registered Democrats, Republicans, and Independents in Iowa. The initial registry was obtained 
from the Iowa Secretary of State in October 2015. Inactive voters were removed, as were those 
with missing or inaccurate data, such as fake telephone numbers. The resulting list contained 
1,905,582 registered active voters, including Democrats (582,450), Republicans (608,691) and 
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Independents (714,441). Five variables were used to create strata or sorting variables to ensure 
variation in age, voter activity, geography, gender, and party affiliation.  
A sample of 12,000 voters was selected, consisting of 5000 Democrats, 5000 
Republicans, and 2000 Independents. From those 12,000 voters, a total of 1076 telephone 
interviews were completed successfully in November 2016, among 515 Democrats, 423 
Republicans, and 138 registered Independents. This provided a response rate of 10% or a 
cooperation rate (number of completed interviews divided by sum of completed interviews, 
refusals, and non-compliance) of 34. 4%.  
A second wave of interviews among first-wave respondents was conducted in January, 
2016, the month prior to the Iowa Caucuses. A total of 746 second wave interviews were 
completed, providing a mortality rate of 31%.  
Within both surveys, items assessed the likelihood of attending a caucus, strength of 
support for a particular candidate, and first choice of candidates. Residence addresses, including 
county, were recorded and used to determine the Nielsen Designated Market Area for each 
participant.  
The outcome of the Iowa Democratic and Republican Caucuses was reported by the 
parties to news media following the completion of the February 1, 2016, event. Each party 
follows its own procedures for reporting results. Republicans report percentages of support for 
each candidate, while Democrats report the number of delegates to the state convention for each 
candidate who received the support of more than 15% of caucus-attendees in each precinct. The 
Associated Press approximates a percentage of Democratic caucus-attendees supporting a 
candidate by multiplying the county-level delegate totals by 100. This research uses the 
Associated Press counts for assessing candidate choice among caucus attendees.  




This research seeks to determine the effects of a high level of candidate advertising on 
political attitudes and behaviors. The analysis was conducted by dividing the eight Iowa media 
markets into high and moderate adspend conditions. The high/moderate determination was made 
based on the number of political spots that were purchased in the market. Pricing was not 
considered as a determining variable, as per spot price would be expected to reference, in part, 
market size and advertising inventory availability. 
Many candidates benefited from advertising purchased by their own campaign 
committees as well as non-candidate organizations such as Super PACs.  For the analysis, overall 
spending and the number of spots from candidate committees and non-candidate organizations 
were pooled on behalf of the candidate.  
While the amount of spending provides a mechanism for assessing the resources devoted 
to a campaign, insight into the number of ads for a candidate were used to estimate the 
percentage of population exposed to the ads and the number of ads for any given candidate seen 
by the average viewer.  
Reach is the percentage of individuals within a target market that sees at least one ad 
from a given advertiser (Tellis, 2004) or in this case study, on behalf of a given candidate. 
Typically expressed as a percentage multiplied by 100, product marketers often use a reach 
target of 65-75.  In other words, within the advertising period 65-75% of the individuals in the 
market will have seen one or more ads. Because usage of any medium tends to follow a curve, an 
attempt to use a single medium to access the entire population is seem as a waste of resources—
the infrequent media users on the tail end of the curve require many runs of the ad, and could be 
accessed more efficiently through a different medium (Tellis, 2009). 
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Another key advertising metric is frequency, the average number of ads seen by an 
individual in the reached population (Webster & Phalen, 1997). Three exposures to an ad were 
considered to be optimum in classic advertising media planning (Ostrow, 1982), with a recent 
meta-analysis finding that under experimental conditions, 10 viewings were optimum (Schmidt 
& Eisend, 2015).   
 Reach and frequency for the overall adspend in each market were estimated on a monthly 
basis for each candidate using Media Flight Plan, an online computer program that determines 
reach and frequency on a per-market basis using daypart averages (Martin & Coons, 2015). For 
each month in each market, the number of broadcast television spots for all candidates were 
pooled into a single buy and divided among four dayparts: primetime (60%), daytime (20%), 
evening news (10%) and late news (10%). From those choices, Media Flight Plan derived the 
monthly reach and frequency for each market.  
Once the markets were divided into high and moderate political advertising conditions, t-
tests were conducted on the responses of the two-wave telephone survey participants who 
indicated membership in the Democratic or Republican parties. Independents, who are not 
permitted to participate in the party caucuses, were excluded from analysis. The within-subjects 
changes over time in intention to participate in the caucus and candidate preference were the 
target variables.  
Results 
Did advertising saturation occur?  
The first ads for the February 2016 caucus ran in April 2015, with political ads running 
every month after that through Caucus Day. Unduplicated contracts with television stations 
totaled 3786, with some of those contracts having been revised seven or more times. The 
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contracts called for a total of 91,355 ads over the nine-month period, with a gross adspend of 
slightly over $46. 3 million. Des Moines was the most active DMA, with slightly under $20 
million of spending. In comparison, one of the most active television advertising categories in 
the Des Moines DMA is convenience stores, with spending measured by Kantar for all brands at 
$1. 9 million in the 12 months preceding the start of the caucus campaigns. To the extent that 
saturation requires additional inputs (such as advertising spending) to be accompanied by a 
concurrent reduction of prior inputs, there were reports of saturation in the Des Moines and 
Cedar Rapids DMAs, where local advertisers could not purchase airtime because of limited 
advertising inventory (Pfannenstiel & Kummer, 2015). (See table 1). 
Non-candidate organizations such as Political Action Committees and Super PACs paid a 
high price for their independence from candidates. Candidate committees are guaranteed to be 
offered the lowest applicable rate for television spots, while PACs and Super PACs can be 
charged at market rates or higher. On average, PACs and Super PACs paid 2. 5 times the per-
spot charge paid by candidate committees.  
Eight candidates and Super PACs spent over $1 million each statewide, with the top 
Republican spenders Marco Rubio ($9. 2 million, mostly via Super PACs,), Jeb Bush ($9. 2 
million, nearly entirely via Super PACs) and Ted Cruz ($4. 4 million, via a mix of candidate 
committee and Super PAC funding). Donald Trump, considered to be a light user of advertising, 
purchased $1. 8 million dollars of advertising. Among the Democrats, Hillary Clinton was the 
top advertiser, at $7. 8 million, and Bernie Sanders with $2. 5 million.  
(PLACE TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE) 
Political advertising and political engagement 
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The first hypothesis addressed the ability of advertising to increase political engagement. 
This was tested by comparing the within-subjects difference in political interest levels between 
the November and January panel surveys among Democrats and Republicans. For members of 
any party (N = 658), political interest, as measured by interest in following the election, 
increased between November and January by less than 1% (M = -. 58, SD = . 614). Between the 
subjects in the high advertising markets and the moderate advertising markets, there was no 
difference in change in political interest (t = 1. 053, ns). Additionally, the intention to caucus was 
high among Democrats and Republicans in both the November and January surveys, but there 
was no within-subjects difference over time between respondents in high advertising and the 
moderate advertising markets (t = . 107, ns). Thus, this study finds no support for H1: Increasing 
levels of political advertising will be associated with increasing amounts of political 
engagement.  
Advertising saturation and candidate preference change 
The historical role of the Iowa caucus was to allow individuals who did not have access 
to vast funding or extensive political organizations to become viable candidates for president. 
Advertising in the Iowa markets is inexpensive compared larger markets, and thus advertising 
budgeting would be less of a barrier to entry. This presupposes that advertising can effect change 
in candidate preference. The second hypothesis was tested by looking at the amount of change 
between November and January in candidate preference for party members in the high 
advertising markets versus the moderate advertising markets. Among Democrats, where there 
were three well-covered candidates at both points (Clinton, O’Malley, Sanders), there was no 
difference in the amount of preference change between high and moderate advertising markets  
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(t = . 534, NS). Results were different in the Republican party, which had 18 well-covered 
candidates in November and 16 well-covered candidates in January. There was a greater degree 
of preference change among Republicans in the high advertising markets, t = -2. 89, P < . 01. 
Thus this study finds partial support for H2: increased amounts of political advertising will be 
associated with increased amounts of change in candidate preference.  
Advertising saturation and political outcome 
The extent to which advertising, especially in large amounts and paid for by outside 
interests, affects the outcome of political races is a key question for our time. If advertising can 
buy victory, then the victors will be the candidates with the greatest financial resources. The 
third hypothesis explored the relationship between advertising and political success. The final 
outcome, as reported by the statewide percentage of support for each candidate for each party, 
was compared to the nine-market tally of spots for each candidate, with spots from interest 
groups such as Super PACs credited to the candidate supported by the Super PAC (See table 2). 
For the three Democratic candidates, there was a .97 correlation between spending and outcome. 
For the 9 Republican candidates who spent more than $100,000 on television advertising (Bush, 
Cruz, Huckabee, Jindal Paul, Perry, Rubio, Trump, and Walker) there was a lesser, but still 
substantial, impact of adspend on outcome, with a correlation of . 28. Among Democrats, with 
only three candidates, there was a strong relationship between adspend and outcome: Clinton, 
who had run the most ads, came in first, followed by second-spender Sanders and then O’Malley. 
Thus, H3 is supported: The amount of television advertising spending will be correlated with 
election outcome.  
(PLACE TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE) 
Discussion 
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This research took advantage of an unusual situation during the 2016 first in the national 
presidential caucus in Iowa. Relatively low-cost television ads were purchased in high numbers 
in some markets, but more modest numbers in others. This natural experiment was used to test 
notions of political advertising effectiveness. In contrast to some earlier studies, increasing levels 
of advertising spending did not serve to activate the interest of potential voters: while it was high 
to begin with, and went higher during the election period, the extra advertising was not 
associated with additional interest. However, there were some, although inconsistent, effects for 
advertising. For the Democratic party, with just three well-covered candidates, extensive 
amounts of broadcast television advertising played no role in shifting allegiances between 
candidates. The results were different among Republicans, where markets with extensive 
advertising saw more churn in allegiances than the modestly-advertised markets.  
The 2016 Iowa Caucus will be remembered for providing a second-place finish for 
Donald Trump, a candidate who commanded extensive amounts news coverage and social media 
interest but purchased relatively small amounts of television advertising. It will also be 
remembered for dashing the election hopes of Jeb Bush, whose political action committees 
purchased millions of dollars of advertising, with disappointing results. Even with these 
exceptional circumstances, there was a substantial positive correlation between advertising 
spending and political outcome. More media money was associated with more votes.  
However, the absence of differences between the high adspend markets and moderate 
adspend markets should tell a cautionary tale to campaign managers. While preference 
(sometimes) and votes (all of the time) followed the media money, there is little in the data to 
suggest that overspending was rewarded. This is consistent with a recent meta-analysis of 
advertising repetition (Schmidt & Eisend, 2015) in which the optimum frequency was proposed 
Political Ad Saturation  
 
19 
to be in the mid-teens, and frequency above that showing no improvement in outcome. Perhaps 
coincidentally, the average frequency for the moderate advertising markets was around 40 in the 
closing month of the campaign, and the average frequency for the high advertising markets 
soared above 120. The lower frequency seemed to provide benefits at a fraction of the cost.  
In addition, the ad purchasing behavior of campaign managers was out-of-sync with 
commercial media buying practice in terms of reach, or the percentage of target market seeing 
one or more ads.  While typical reach targets are generally around 65-75, reach in the two high 
spending markets averaged just under 89 for the bulk of the year-long campaign, rising to 99.8 in 
the final full month of advertising. Those last 25-35 points of reach, which added only light 
television viewers to the tally, came at the expense of over-advertising to the viewers who spend 
a large or even typical amount of time with television.  In the moderate spending markets, reach 
for the average month was around 50, possibly indicating underspending: only heavy television 
viewers would have seen ads in the low-spending months.   
From a public policy standpoint, the outcome of the 2016 Iowa Presidential Caucus 
provides a disturbing look at the power of money in politics. The opponents of the Citizens 
United decision (Levitt, 2010) decry the distortion of advertising spending on political choice. In 
Iowa, citizens had face-to-face access to most of the candidates for the better part of a year, plus 
a vigorous debate in the press, but their choices were still associated with the amount of 
advertising purchased. Money has an outsized impact on political power.  
Limitations 
The findings should be interpreted in the context of the limitations of both case studies 
and natural experiment methods. As the set of first in the nation caucuses is limited to a single 
state, the results seen in Iowa may not be replicated elsewhere or at another time. Approximately 
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$92 was spent in television advertising per each caucus-goer. Were that same amount projected 
on the national turnout of the 2012 presidential election (Peters & Ragsdale, 2015), the television 
adspend would have totaled $11. 86 billion, an amount that would be equivalent to 15% of the 
total 2015 adspend for broadcast and cable television for all products and services advertised, 
nationwide.  
The natural experiment reduced the amount of experimental control. While subjects were 
randomly selected from the list of all registered voters, their decisions on where to live in state 
(within the two largest DMAs in the center of the state, or in the seven DMAs that share borders 
with other states) was non-random, making the assignment to high or moderate advertising levels 
non-random. Additionally, as the telephone surveys did not capture exposure to advertising, 
media exposure was assumed to be randomly distributed among all participants in the differing 
conditions.  Finally, this research focused on a single medium at a time when candidates and 
campaigns were not only using multiple mass media and social media but also avidly pursuing 
interpersonal events. Several candidates promised to visit every one of the 99 counties, and at 
least one, Ted Cruz, did. The extent to which mass media (other than broadcast television 
advertising) social media and personal interactions differed between the high and moderate ad 
level markets is an unknown.  
However, this research provides a window into the extremities of political advertising 
and shows what might happen as political advertising continues its expansion. Even in an 
election cycle in which a single celebrity candidate soaked up much of the news coverage, there 
was a variable but positive relationship between the amount of advertising and the percentage of 
votes won by candidates. While increased levels of advertising were not associated with 
increased interest in the campaign or changes in intention to participate, high levels of 
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advertising were associated with a greater degree of change in candidate preference. In the case 
of the 2016 Iowa Caucuses, saturation advertising provided limited but measurable effects.  
  The extent to which the saturation will continue in future election cycles can be the 
subject of future research. However, the research will be difficult to conduct as greater amounts 
of resources move to digital advertising. Television stations are required to report political 
broadcast advertising to the FCC, but no such requirements exist for non-licensed media such as 
digital, newspapers, and outdoor advertising. Spending may increase, but public oversight will be 
reduced. Other methods, such as single-source monitoring, may need to be considered as the 
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Table 1: Results 
 
Broadcast advertising sales 
contracts, April 2015-
February 2016. N = 3786 
High Political Advertising Markets Moderate Political Markets 
Markets (DMA rank) Des Moines-Ames (mkt. size: 72) 
Cedar Rapids, Waterloo (90) 
Omaha- Council Bluffs (mkt 
size: 74) 
Davenport, Rock Island, 
Moline (101) 






Sioux Falls (110) 
Adspend (all)  $29,347,563 $16,967,641 
Spot totals 50,141 41,214 
Per spot cost  $430 (campaign committee) 
$949 (Super PAC) 
$290 (campaign committee) 
$583 (Super PAC) 
Monthly reach  88. 9 (mean, April-Jan.) 
SD = 36.06 
99. 8 (peak, Jan 2016) 
 
49.4 (mean, April-Jan.)  
SD = 27.4 
93. 8 (peak, Jan 2015) 
 
Monthly frequency  
 
23.4 (mean, April-Jan.) 
SD = 35.15 
123.5 (peak, Jan. 2016) 
 
7.8 (mean April-Jan) 
SD = 12.5 
40.0 (peak, Jan. 2016) 
 
Panel survey results  
Wave 1: Nov 2015, 
Wave 2: Jan 2016 
n = 533 n = 204 
N = 737   
Age 62. 5 64. 2 
Gender 50. 4% female, 49. 5% male 52. 4% female, 47. 5% male 
Party 53. 2% Dem 
35. 4% Rep 
11. 2% Independent 
 
39. 2% Dem 
48% Rep 




Table 2: Outcomes 
Results of the 2016 Iowa 
Caucuses.  Adspend Votes (%) Pearson R 
Republicans   . 28, P<. 05 
Ted Cruz $4,405,665 27. 60  
Donald J. Trump $1,845,150 24. 30  
Marco Rubio $9,250,149 23. 10  
Ben Carson $2,482,856 9. 30  
Rand Paul $387,420 4. 50  
Jeb Bush $9,156,679 2. 80  
Democrats 
  
. 95, P<. 05 
Hillary Clinton $7,830,839 49. 9*  
Bernie Sanders $5,507,265 49. 6*  
Martin O'Malley $1,874 0. 6* 
 
*Voter equivalents, as calculated by Associated Press.  
 
 
